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One of the most remarkable developments in  investors, it can quickly outlive its usefulness.
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been the  The incentives it fosters may not only bleed
region's opening to foreign direct investment.  domestic treasuries, but may also lead to bureau-
CEE states saw foreign investment climb from  cratic structures that complicate the investment
minuscule amounts in 1989 to more than $7  environment and elevate information and trans-
billion in 1992. All CEE states have enacted new  action costs for foreign investors. As quickly as
laws on foreign investment as well as related  possible, the transforming economies should
legislation in areas such as taxation and company  dismantle the enclave and put domestic and
and environmental law.  foreign investors on an equal footing. This may
well mean that foreign investment laws r-re  no
Gray and Jarosz describe these efforts at  longer needed. The Czech and Slovak Federal
legal reform and assess their impact on foreign  Republic was the first CEE country to abolish
investment in light of what is known about  specific foreign investment legislation in favor of
investor motivation. They concentrate on the role  a broad commercial code covering all investors.
of foreign investment law, referring occasionally
to other aspects of law that apply to domestic and  If an enclave does exist, policymakers
foreign investors. They find that specialized  should focus on the concerns critical to foreign
foreign investment laws can jn'lay a useful role  firms. In the design of investment laws to date,
during the transition to a maiKet economy. Of  the CEE countries have perhaps paid too much
particular importance is their role in sending a  attention to preferential tax schemes, ignoring
strong signal to foreign entrepreneurs that the  other costs foreign investors face. Policymakers
host country is serious about economic reform  should focus on reducing uncertainty and
and is willing to work with investors to establish  transaction costs through clear and simple
mutually beneficial arrangements.  legislation, contract enforcement, arbitration and
other altemative dispute resolution mechanisms,
Foreign investment laws are also often used  stronger protection of property rights, dissemina-
to target special incentives to foreigners and  tion of information on laws and on business
create an island of legal development that may  opportunities, and an end to unnecessary bureau-
differ from - and sometimes outpace - other  cratic intervention. Complex regulations not only
legal development  In such ways they tend to  increase investor uncertainty but divert bureau-
create investment "enclaves." But to the extent  cratic resources that the host country cannot
that an enclave separates foreign from domestic  afford to squander.
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IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Rarely in economic history has change been as rapid and dramatic as that which has
occurred in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) since 1989.  Four years ago private enterprise
was not only unknown but illegal in  many of the CEE states.  Isolated behind regulations
imposed by communist governments  and Western bans on trade, these states were largely cut
off from the wo~rld  economy.
One of the most remarkable  developments  during this period has been the opening  of the
region to  foreign direct investment (FDI). 1 CEE states saw foreign investment climb from
minuscule  amounts  in 1989  to over $US 7 billion in 1992. Legal reform has been central to this
process.  All CEE states have enacted new laws on  foreign investment as  well as related
legislation in  areas such as company law, taxation, and environmental  law. 2 After briefly
outlining the importance  of foreign investment  to the region, this paper describes these efforts
at legal reform and attempts to assess their impact on foreign investment in light of what is
known  about investor motivation. The paper concentrates  on the role of foreign investment  law
per se, although other aspects of the legal framework  that apply to both domestic and foreign
investors may occasionally  be referred to. 3
The Importance of Foreign Investment  to the Region
A report issued in  1992 by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations
labels transnational  corporations, and the investments  they make, as "engines  of development." 4
1.  All  discussion  of  foreign  investment  in  this  paper  refers  to  foreign direct  (as  opposed  to  portfolio)
investment.
2.  Czechoslovakia  adopted a new foreign investment law soon after its  1989 revolution,  but such legislation
was subsequently superceded by the new Commercial Code, which took effect in January,  1992, and covers both
domestic and  foreign investors.
3.  For a survey of underlying legal frameworks for private sector development in CEE,  see Gray et.al.,  "The
Legal Framework for Private Sector Development in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Poland,"  Georgia Journal
of Intemational and  ComParative Law 22:2 (Spring  1992);  Gray,  Hanson and Ianachkov,  'Romania's  Evolving
Legal Framework  for Private  Sector Development,"  The American  University Journal  of  International  Law and
Policy 7:3  (Spring  1992);  Gray  and  Stiblar,  "The Evolving  Legal Framework  for Private  Sector  Activity in
Slovenia," University of Pennsylvania Joumal of Business Law,  forthcoming (Spring 1993);  Gray and Janachkov,
"Bulgaria's  Evolving Legal Framework  for Private Sector Development,"  The Intemational Lawver,  forthcoming
(Winter  1993); Gray,  Hanson, and Heller,  "Legal Reform for Hungary's Private  Sector," The George Washington
Journal of International Law and Economics, forthcoming (March 1993); Gray,  'The  Legal Framework  for Private
Sector Activity in the Czech Republic," Vanderbilt Journal  of Transnational Law,  forthcoming (May  1993).
4.  United  Nations  Centre  on  Transnational  Corporations,  World  Investment  Report  1992:  Transnational
Corporations as Entines  of Growth;  New York:  United Nations,  1992.2
In the second  half of the 1980s,  foreign  investment  grew  three  times  faster  than  domestic  output,
and for many countries  it is a stronger  tie to the world  economy  than trade.  In 1991,  over
35,000  tansnational  corporations  invested  approximately  $US 154  billion  in the  world  economy.
Developing  and transitional  countries  captured  about 16 percent  of this--some  $US  25 billion.
Since abandoning  central planning  and turning  to market  reforms  in 1989, the CEE
countries  have  enthusiastically  sought  the capital,  technology,  and management  skills  offered  by
foreign  investors. Foreign  investment  in these  countries  has  grown  rapidly  from  a very  low  base
and now  accounts  for about  9% of total  FDI flows  to developing  and transitional  countries
(Figure  1). The  latest  available  figures,  albeit  quite  rough,  show  steady  growth  in both  numbers
of direct  investments  and cumulative  value  across  the region, with Hungary  leading  the way  in
both  total  FDI and FDI per capita  terms  (Figures  2 and 35). Several  studies  forecast  that  in the
1990s  the countries  of CEE  and the for 1ner Soviet  Union  (FSU)  could  attract  as much  as $US
50-75  billion  in foreign  investment. 6
Despite  this auspicious  entry  into the world  economy,  the level of foreign  investment  in
the CEE  region  is only a tiny fraction  of what is needed. New  investment  is needed  to turn
Figure  1:
Value  of Foreign  Investment
(cumulative  until  mid-1992)
Central  and  Eastern Europe 90/o
Latin  America 38 %  Middle  East 5%
Sub-Saharan  Africa 5%
Southem  Europe 3%
Asia 40%
Source:  World  Bank,  "Attracting  Private  Investment,'  EMENA  Technical  Department,  September,  1992
5.  It is very difficult to obtain accurate data on foreign investment commnitments  and flows.  Data are not
readily  comparable  across  countries  because  of different  accounting  methodologies,  and even  within a single  country
different  sources give highly  variable figures. Figures  2-4 show the authors' best estimates,  compiled  from various
sources. They should be treated as rough indicators  only.
6.  Studies  cited  in United  Nations, suvRa  note 4, p. 32.3
around CEE economies,  which  are
Figure  2:  Value  of  Foreign  Investment  now suffering  from  a  production
4.5-  Ct1V*t  W  Monfl9|  decline  that surpasses  even that of
the  yreat depression  of  1928-32.
Furtnermore,  foreign  capital  is
9 _  /  needed  to finance  privati?ation  and
restructuring  of  state  owned
enterprises.  For  example,
§  2.  /  Jaroslav  Prochazka,  the  former
1.:  /%  /////director  of foreign relations at the
Ministry of Industry of the Czech
and  Slovak  Federal  Republic
a  ~~~~~~~~~(CSFR),  estimated  that
.- ~Iy  c1l.  POIWWrestructuring  in 1992 alone would
require between $US  1.8 billion
and  $US  2.2  billion,  and  that
domestic  sources could cover only
40% of the total. Prochazka  noted that "foreign  investment  is one of the essential  conditions  for
the effective restructuring  of industry and also of the future prosperity of the country." 7 The
Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Alexander Shokhin, declared that the Russian government
would  seek $US 5 billion in foreign  investment  by mid-1995. This is more than double  the total
foreign  investment  in Russia since 1987,8  but it is very little in the context of Russia's gigantic
need for restructuring  and new investment. In comparison,  in the first 2 years  after reunification
Germany  poured over $US 100 billion into its eastern half. 9
While the need for foreign investment is up sharply in CEE and the FSU, the global
environment  for direct investment  is growing more competitive  for two reasons.  First, while
absolute  flows of foreign investment  continue to grow, the rate of increase has fallen  due to the
sluggish  economic  growth in th_ United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Increases  in direct
investments  by Japanese corporations  provided much of the growth in foreign investment  flows
in  the  1980s.  From  1985 to  1989, Japanese corporations increased tiheir foreign direct
investments  at an average annual rate of 62 per cent.  However, direct investment fell in the
early 1990s.  In the year ending March 1992, Japanese foreign direct investment was $41.6
billion, compared  to $56.9 billion  in the previous  year, and Japan's overall European  investment
was down $5 billion.' 0
7. J. Prochazka,  *Unfreezing  the flow of capital to the Czech  Republic,"  Central Eurogean,  no. 14 (July/Aug.
1992), p. 34.
8.  Agence  France Presse, July 17, 1992.
9.  L. Gay, 'Point of no return," The Atlanta  Journal and Constitution,  May 24, 1992,  p. G-7.
10.  Reuters, June 5, 1992.4
Second,  just as the growth
of the supply of direct investment  Figure  3:  Per  Caoita  Foreign  Investment
is  decreasing,  crmpetition  for  Cmiatlv  to1,ge
investment funds  is  pickilg  up  1W_
across the world as a new group
of countries attempt to hitch on to
the growth engine of FDI.  New
players, such as Laos and Vietnam
in East Asia, India in South Asia,
and Cuba in the Caribbean, have
revised  their regulations  restricting
foreign  investment  and  opened
their  economies  to  flows  of  P77771 '!'-p-i
foreign  funds.  And  well-  cLVwa  ...  O
established players,  such as  the
ASEAN countries,  are  growing
even  more  competitive as  their
economies  continue to expand and their investment  climates become even more favorable.
As noted earlier, the strongest  magnet for foreign  investment  in the CEE region has been
Hungary, attracting almost two-thirds of the investment  in the region since 1989.  But when
growth of investment in Hungary is compared to the levels of investment in other successful
developing states--such  as the special economic  zones of China and some of the more recent
entrants into the global economy, India and Venezuela--the  competition that CEE faces in
attracting investment to CEE becomes clear (Figure 4).
In sum, the CEE cot;ntries  face a daunting  challenge. Their need for foreign capital  and
know-how  to repair their economies  and stimulate  growth is immense. Yet the rate of expansion
of  global investment has decreased, and  competition for  foreign funds,  technology and
management  skills is tighter than ever.  How are the CEE states restructuring their foreign
investment regimes Lo  promote investment? Do their laws appeal to the concerns of foreign
investors? Before tuming to the legal framework, we take a brief look at investor motivation,
because designing  an appropriate legal framework  conducive  to foreign investment requires at
least a basic understanding  of what motivates  investors.
Why Do Firms Invest Abroad?
The subject of investor motivation  has received  a great deal of attention  in the academic
literature and in policy circles, spawning  a vigorous debate which has continued since the5
Figure 4:
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1960s.' 1 This research has found, above all, that motivations  which lead firms to invest abroad
are complex and are likely to vary from manufacturing  to service industries, from acquisitions
to greenfield investments,  and from export to import-substituting  industries.
Much of the discussion  implicitly  borrows from the standard  model of foreign trade, the
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  (HOS) model.  The HOS model argues that differences in factor
endowments  drive trade.  Countries  rich in capital export capital intensive  goods, and countries
rich in labor export labor intensive goods.  An analogous model is then applied to foreign
investment:  production moves abroad in response to lower costs, due either to lower factor
prices or other specific "locational"  cost advantages. One such "locational"  cost advantage  that
drives many investment  decisions is that caused by host country tariff barriers, which protect
domestic  production  from trade competition  and thereby  force foreign firms to invest if they are
to service the host country market.
To take a CEE example of "locational" advantages, the Gerber division of H.J. Heinz
recently committed  $US 25 million to acquire a 60 per cent stake in Alima SA, a leading baby
11.  For a review of the state of the literature, see John Cantwell, 'A  survey of theories of international
production,"  in C. N. Pitelis and R. Sugden,  eds., The Nature of the Transnational  Firm, New York: Routledge,
1991. In writing  this paper, this literature  has been supplemented  by questionnaires  and follow-up  interviews  with
a sample of American firms who have considered  investing in the CEE region.6
food and fruit juice maker in Poland.' 2 Alima was an attractive  target for investment  because
of its relatively modem machinery  and its location  near supplies  of fruit and packaging  and near
growing mark.ts (in CEE as well as Western Europe).  According  to one analyst, purchasing
Alima and shipping  throughout  Europe will cost one-tenth  as much as attempting  to service the
European market from plants in the United States."
Although  specific  "locational"  advantages  are clearly important,  they do not fully  explain
patterns of foreign investment  flows.' 4 Indeed, direct investment  is not the only way firms can
reap the benefits of differential  factor prices. Rather than invest  directly, foreign firms  can trade
infonraally  or through long-term contracts, or they can license technology .J  foreign firms for
production abroad." 5 In deciding to invest in production abroad, the firm is calcul  -ting that
there is a net benefit to bringing the operation  inside  the structure  of the firm, rather than buying
the product  on the market and re-selling  it or licensing  technology  to foreign  producers. In other
words, the foreign firm believes that it possesses specific  advantages  tbat enable it to produce
and/or market at lower cost than domestic firms.
Economists  have classified the potential advantages  possessed by foreign investors into
two types: ownership advantages  and internalization  z4vantages.' 6 Ownership advantages are
those assets that are specific to the foreign firm itself, such as superior technology  or special
management  skills.  Internalization  advantages  are those benefits that accrue to any modern
corporation from organizing  and coordinating  a variety of tasks in a single organization, most
notably a reduction in transaction  costs. Thus, to return to the example  of Gerber, it is not  just
that wage, input, and transport costs are lower in Poland.  Polish firms also operate with these
same factor prices.  It is also that Gerber possesses some specific advantages:  ownership
advantages, in  that  it  has  a  recognized brand name that differentiates its  product,  and
internalization  advantages, in that its combining  of manufacturing,  marketing and distribution
in a single corporate structure lowers costs and increases efficiency.
The legal framework affects all three types of advantages--those  gained from location,
12.  Intemational  Herald Tribune, July 28, 1992;  Bill Vlasic, 'Gerber gobbles  up big Polish  baby food firm,"
The Detroit News, October 4, 1991, p. E-1.
13.  Interview, Washington,  D.C., July 28, 1992
14.  Cantwell,  supra note 11.
15.  These alternative strategies are arrayed along a spectrum from pure market transactions (trade) to
hierarchical  transactions  (direct investment). O.E. Williamson,  Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis  and Antitrust
Implications,  New York:  Free Press, 1975.
16.  For a summary, see J.  H. Dunning, J. A. Cantwell,  and T.A.B. Corley, "The Theory of International
Production: Some Hi:torical Antecedents,"  and M. Casson, "General  Theories of the Multinational  Enterprise:
Their Relevance  to Business  History," in P. Hertner  and G. Jones,Multinationals: Theory and History, London:
Gower, 1986.7
from  ownership,  and from  internalization.  Miuch  of the academic  discussion  to date  has  focused
on the effect  of government  policies  and legal rules and regulations  on the first type, i.e., the
cost of various  factors  of production. 'The  effects  can be pro or con--for  example,  minimum
wage or other employment-related  rules can drive up labor costs and thus deter investment,
while  tax incentives  can  lower  the cost  of capital  and thus attract  investment.  But policies  and
regulations  that affect the ability of foreign firms to apply their ownership  advantages  or
internalization  advantagas  also  affect  the profitability  of multinational  enterprises  and thus  their
decisions  to expand  abroad.  For example,  weak  legal codes that fail to protect  proprietary
intellectual  property  discourage  the application  of firm specific  assets  and thus  deter  investment.
Similarly,  overly-aggressive  antimonopoly  laws can vitiate the internalization  advantages  of
multinational  firms  and thereby  discourage  investment.  As  discussed  below,  CEE  policy  makers
should  carefully  consider  these  various  dimensions  of investor  motivation  when  developing  the
legal  framework  for foreign  investment.
How Do CEE  Laws  Affect  Investment  Decisions  of Foreign  Firms?
Prior to the first  World  War, foreign  investment  was a prominent  feature  of the regional
CEE  economy.  The  legal  codes  in these  countries  generally  supported  the institutions  of foreign
investment, and many of  the  major industries in  the  region were built  by  foreign
entrepreneurs. 17 The communist  governments  that came  to power  after the second  World  War
effectively  limited  foreign  involvement  in the region's  economies  to co-production  agreements
or the purchase  of turn-key  manufacturing  plants.  By the end of the 1970s  there was an
awareness  throughout  the Eastern bloc that the technology  gap with the West was growing
larger, and that the old methods  of purchasing  technology  were not effectively  raising the
technological  level in the region.  Thus, in 1971  Romania  began to change  its regulations
goverming  foreign  investment  in the hope of luring  technological  change. Other  CEE states
slowly  followed  suit, but  given  res.Actions  on foreign  ownership,  lack  of  currency  convertibility,
and a host  of other  roadblocks,  Western  investment  remained  negligible  through  the 1980s.
Only  after the dissolution  of communist  power  in 1989  did these  states  begin  to change
their investment  climates  in a concerted  effort to attract foreign investment. Yet, at the
beginning  of the post-communist  period  there was a somewhat  schizophrenic  quality  in their
legal regimes  governing  foreign investment. Leaders were keenly aware of the need for
investment  yet sensitive  to political  charges  of "selling  out" to foreigners. On a state  visit to
Britain  in the spring  of 1991,  Lech Walesa  the Polish  president  sought  to drum up investment
in an interview  with thZ  Financial  Times: "You  in the West have  over-production.  You can
make  money  out of our shortages  and our stupidity--and  we have  plenty  of that. . . Come  and
17.  In CEE, many old laws that technically  governed  foreign  investment  remained on the books throughout
the Communist  period, although  they  were overruled  or replaced  in practice  by government  decrees  and regulations.
In the post-communist  period many of these  old laws have come  back to life.  The commercial  code of Poland, for
example,  is basically  the law of the 1930s.8
set up a factory here.  Make money."" 8 As encouraging as Walesa's remarks sounded, th.
Polish investment  law in force at the time allowed foreign enterprises to repatriate only 15 per
cent of the profits they earned in Poland. Even now, as GDP levels continue to decline across
the region, foreign investment  remains a target for seme opposition  politicians. For example,
although the CSFR (and its successor states, the Czech Republic and Slovalia) have pushed
ahead with legal reforms and attracted  reasonable  amounts  of investment  to date, Zbynek  Kozel,
deputy international secretary of the Social Democratic Party, recently charged that foreign
investment  is "a dangerous sellout."" 9
The origin of much of the anti-foreign  sentiment  which surfaces from time to time in the
CEE states is the separate and often privileged treatment that has been granted to foreign
investors. One of the central characteristics  of the first stage in the transition from a socialist
to a market economy  has been the creation of a special "enclave" for foreigners. The enclave
typically serves at  least three  purposes.  First,  it provides an  important information--or
"signaling"--function  to potential  investors. Second,  it provides a limited sphere in wnich legal
development  can proceed differently  and often more rapiely, thus bypassing  many of the hurdles
to legal and institutional  development in the economy at large.  Third, it allows for special
incentives to be targeted to foreigners--those  who are perhaps seen to be most influenced  by
them.  All three purposes apply to some extent in developing  countries more generally--where
ever the underlying legal and incentive frameworks for private sector activity are unclear or
weak.  However, their rationale is particularly strong in  the CEE context because of the
magnitude  of the systemic  changes needed to meet the needs of foreign investors.
Wnile  these purposes may  be valid, the enclave  approach  entails  major costs, as discussed
later, that must be weighed against its benefits.  The sooner a country can move to dismantle
the enclave  and provide equal treatment for domestic and foreign investors, the better.
Signaling  Potentirl Investors
Interviews with multinational firms consistently indicate that uncertainty is a prime
impediment  to invqtment in the CEE region. Firms may not be familiar with the legal regimes
or with potential  joint venture partners, and getting information  is costly.  A valuable  and often
overlooked  function of foreign investment law is to send a strong, positive signal to potential
investors. While  vaguely worded declarations  may not assuage  investor's concems, the passage
of clear and supportive  foreign investment  legislation  does convey the message that investment
is welcome.
Recognizing  the important signaling  effects of changes in the legal regime governing
foreign investment, all  of the  CEE countries issued declarations early  in  their transitions
guaranteeing the security of foreign investment.  These declarations were accompanied or
18.  "Visionary  seeks an equal chance," Financial  Times, April 23, 1991, p. 19.
19.  Robert Cohen, "Czechoslovakia's  Wall Street  brigade," New York Times, June 21, 1992, p. 1..9
quickly  followed  by new or amended  foreign  investment  laws, changes in the tax regimes
applicable  to foreigners,  and bilateral  investment  treaties  with investors'  home  countries. 20
Even  with these  early steps,  firms  face  continued  uncertainty  in the broad legal regime
governing  foreign  investment  in the region. Across  the region  the laws  in many  areas--from  the
rights of former  landowners  to recover  title, to rules on liability  for previous  environmental
damage,  to regulations  governing  the financial  sector--remain  in flux.  Foreign  entrepreneurs
recognize  the risk inherent  m investing  in any reforming  economy. Yet they  also recognize,  as
one businessman  noted, that "if you wait for the risk to disappear,  the opportunity  will also
disappear.  "21 Foreign  investors'  attitudes  toward  risk are highly  variable,  but it does appear
that  the  passage  of legislation  that  indicates  that  the government  is serious  about  encouraging  and
protecting investment  is an important  first step.
Developing  the Legal  Framework
A second  rationale  for the enclave  strategy  is to provide  a separate  legal framework  for
foreign  investors. On the one hand, such  a framework  may be needed  to police access  to the
incentives  discussed  below. This is the reason, for example,  for special  entry regulations,  as
discussed  below. On the other hand, such a framework  can provide  a semblance  of order,
predictability,  and enforceability  in an otherwise  highly uncertain  and undeveloped  legal
environment. Such a legal framework  does little to lower factor  costs, but it can go far in
creating  an environment  in which  firms  can realize  ownership  and internalization  advantages.
While  progress  has been  made  in this area  in all CEE  countries,  there is stil a long way  to go.
The legal and regulatory  costs of organizing  and operating  joint ventures  or wholy-
owned Cbsidiaries in a host country fall into two broad categories: ex ante costs and ex post
costs.  Ex ante costs are the costs associated  with setting  up the venture.  These include
negotiation  costs and aU of the costs incurred in obtaining  government  approval for the
transaction.  The  costs  in shepherding  an investment  through  a tangle  of government  procedures
for licensing  and registration  can be significant,  and can discourage  firms from entering  the
market. Ex post costs  are those  incurred  in running  the organization.  Most typically,  ex post
costs  arise in policing  the original  agreement,  protecting  property  rights,  and settling  disputes.
Legal developments  that reduce these various costs help firms to realize ownership  and
internalization  advantages  and thus  improve  the overall  investment  climate  in a country.
Making  new investments. Most co'intries  in the region have significantly  eased the
process  of establishing  new, or "greenfield"  investments.  All countries  allow foreign  firms  to
set  up wholly-owned  subsidiaries,  thus  eliminating  the  requirement  to find  domestic  partners  and
20. For example,  American  investors  are further  protected  in Poland, the former CSFR, and Bulgaria  by those
countries' bilateral investment  treaties with the United States, and investors from EC countries are protected by
certain provisions  in the EC Association  Agreements  with Hungary, Poland, and the former CSFR.
21.  Interview, Washington.  D.C., August 4, 1992.10
negotiate joint  venture arrangements.  While all  countries in  the  region prohibit foreign
investment  in specific  sectors (defense,  energy, domestic  telecommunications  and banking being
the most common), the process is now quite easy in other cases, typically  very similar to that
applicable  to domestic firms.
Hungary led the way in streamlining  the procedures necessary for government  approval
of foreign investments. In 1990, Hungary amended  its Investment  Act and eliminated the need
for  prior  government approval of  foreign investments, including wholly-owned foreign
investments.  Fims  now must meet incorporation requirements applicable to all firms and
register within thirty days of the adoption  of their articles of incoiporation. Poland followed  suit
in new foreign investment  legislation  enacted  on June 14, 1991, and CSFR did the same in the
enactment  of its new Commercial  Code that went into effect January 1, 1992.  The Bulgarian
foreign  investment  law rules that went into effect on February 1, 1992, drop previous minimum
investment requirements of $US 50,000 and require prior government permission only for
investments in natural resources, defense, banking, and insurance.  Of all the CEE countries,
only Romania  continues  to require prior government  approval  of all foreign  investment,  but even
here approval is deemed granted if no decision is rendered in 30 days.
Acquiring ongoing businesses.  While accurate figures on  the  relative numbers of
greenfield investment are not available, it appears that they are heavily outnumbered  by joint
ventures or buy-outs of existing host country firms.  Foreign firms generally  prefer to operate
through  joint ventures or acquisitions,  because working with domestic firms or acquiring their
assets  is easier than starting  from scratch. Domestic  managers  often  possess valuable knowledge
of local markets, familiarity  with established  suppliers and customers, and contacts within the
government that are difficult for the foreign firm to duplicate.  Only when a foreign firm is
introducing a new product is greenfield  investment  generally more advantageous. 22
Unfortunately, from the perspective  of foreign firms, investing  in an ongoing enterprise
draws them into the quagmire of privatization regulations.  The details of the privatization
programs differ in each country.  In Poland and the former CSFR, the process has been split
into separate  procedures for "large" and "small" enterprises.  However, in all countries there
is direct government intervention in  the process.  While this is  understandable given that
governments  are indeed the "sellers" of the firms being privatized, the direct involvement  of the
government  in the selection  of foreign partners and the approval of privatization  proposals has
caused confusion and uncertainty  for many foreign investors.  Administrative  law remains one
of the least developed  areas of law in the CEE countries.  Regularized  procedures for official
decisionmaking  are often lacking; there are few established channels for public input into the
process; decisionmaking  if often opaque; and those turned down in the privatization  process are
generally given neither a statement  of cause nor any opportunity  to appeal the decision.
22.  For example,  Levi Strauss  has committed  $US 20m  over four years to manufacture  Levi's jeans in Poland.
The venture  includes  not only  a greenfield  manufacturing  plant, but also integration  forward  into retailing. The cost
of converting local garment plants to modem manufacturing  was prohibitive, and franchising  retail outlets was
impractical  due to lack of domestic  capital.11
The experience of McDonnell Douglas in Poland illustrates  the frustration felt by many
foreign firms in the wake of what appear to be arbitrary procedures. In June, 1991, following
a decision by a special government commission,  McDonnell Douglas signed a letter of intent
with LOT, the Polish airline, to deliver nine MD 80 aircraft. 23 The letter of intent contained
an "offset" clause in which McDonnell committed  itself to invest $US 85 million in Poland's
aircraft industry.  Then in August the government  reversed itself and gave authority to LOT to
choose its supplier directly.  Over the objections  of the Solidarity trade union, LOT picked
McDonnell's  competitor, Boeing, despite  the fact that Boeing  had only promised  offsets of $US
30 million. McDonnell  claimed it had started to produce the airplanes  and stood to lose several
millions of dollars.  Although there could have been justifiable reasons for the reversal, no
official  government explanation  was given.
Experiences  like these are now common  throughout the region.  In Hungary, the State
Privatization  Agency rejected Colgate-Palmolive's  bid for a Hungarian cosmetic firm.  After
acknowledging  that Colgate's bid was the "most serious" it had received, SPA refused to give
a reason for the rejection.  Noting the 18 months Colgate had spent on the proposal, a Colgate
official  complained, "It was lengthy, it was expensive, it was involved, and it was unsuccessful.
The chapter is closed.  "24 Similar experiences  have  occurred in Hungary involving  PepsiCo and
R .J. Reynolds.25  One American attorney  argued that experiences  like these have caused some
U.S. firms to pull out of the market completely. 26
The lack of established, regularized procedures for the inclusion of foreign investment
in privatization  also may open the door to real or implied corruption in the host country.  This
may lead not only to possible economic losses, as projects are given approval on the basis of
side  payments  rather than economic  efficiency  or feasibility, but also to political  losses. Charges
of bribery and corruption can easily erode popular support for economic  reform in general and
foreign  investment  in particular. Despite  its having  been the  h'  t bidder, Gerber's investment
in the Polish firm Alima has been criticized  in the Polish press as tantamount  to theft, because
the decision process was largely hidden from public view and comment.'  There are growing
signs that governments  in the region are increasingly  sensitive  to the need to maintain  political
support for the reform process, even at the expense of foreign investment.  The Hungarian
Minister in charge of privatization,  Tamas Szabo, recently announced that domestic  bids would
23.  Miroslaw Glogowski, "New Boeings for LOT,"  Warsaw Voice, September 22,  1991; Christopher
Bobinski,  "Polish aircraft workers near strike over Boeing  order," Financial  Times, September  20, 1991,  p. 3.
24.  Ken Kasriel, 'Hungary's troubled  business ties," Christian Science  Monitor, July 7, '992, p.2.
25.  The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., International  Trade Reporter, v. 9, no. 33, August L,  1992, p.
1402.
26.  Interview, Washington,  D.C., August 17, 1992.
27.  Patricia Koza, 'U.S.  seeks smoother  path for investment  in Poland," United Press International,  June 3,
1992.12
now be preferred in the privatization  process over similar foreign bids.  Price alone would no
longer determine ownership. 28 This change of policy may have little practical effect, given the
lack of domestic capital, but it does send a signal which may create further uncertainty in the
minds of foreign investors.
The relative ex ante costs of making an investment  overseas can be significant. 2'  Rather
than focusing on tax incentives (discussed  below), which are of questionable  utility in attracting
foreign firms, CEE countries  should  exert more effort in reducing  the transaction  costs faced by
firms seeking to identify opportunities  and make investments. Instead of constantly changing
tax rates in an effort to optimize locational incentives, these states should concentrate upon
creating stable, transparent environments in  which foreign entrepreneurs can  more easily
calculate the costs and benefits of investing  and make the actual investments with a minimum
of time and effort.
The issue of national economic  sovereignty  will continue to be important.  But the CEE
states can best guard against  opposition to foreign ownership by establishing  clear, xcviewable
procedures that are transparent to both the interested  public and the relevant foreign firms.  In
this way the public can be protected  from bureaucratic  corruption, and the firms can be assured
that their efforts to invest will be fairly evaluated.
Repatriating  profits.  Ownership and intemalization  advantages  of foreign firms cannot
be fully reaped unless profits can be repatriated  to the investor's home country.  Indeed, profit
repatriation is consistently  cited by studies of investor motivation as being among the highest
concerns of potential  investors. In the early period of reform, the inability to repatriate profits
was a significant hindrance throughout the region.  Foreign exchange was scarce, and CEE
governments reacted to this scarcity by limiting the rights of foreign investors to repatriate
profits. Lack of currency  convertibility  made it relatively  easy to enforce these restrictions. All
domestic investment had to take place in local currency, and foreign firns  were required to
convert hard currency at a state-controlled  bank.  Poland and the former CSFR set limits on
profit repatriation of 1530  and 25 percent of profits, respectively, while Romania set sector-
28.  'New privatization  measures," East European Business  Law, June, 1992.
29.  According  to some analyses,  these costs  are responsible  for the regional  clustering of direct investment  by
the industrialized  countries. The United States is more likely to invest in Latin America, and Japan prefers south
east Asia, because  cultural similarity  and past experience  cause their firms to have relative advantages  in reducing
the transction costs that accompany  investment. This may be one reason for the predominance  of German and
Austrian investments  in CEE.  U.N. Centre for Transnational  Corporations,  sunra note 4.
30.  This limit  did not apply if the firm generated  sufficient  net foreign  exchange  earnings to cover the amount
repatriated.13
specific  limits ranging from 8-15 percent. 31
Improvements  in the balance of payments  environment  helped  lead to changes in the law.
Full repatriation  of profits is now allowed in all CEE countries. Romania was the last to lift its
limits--in May, 1992.  All of the states except Hungary permit full repatriation of wages of
foreign  employees. Hungary limits wage repatriation  to 50 per cent.
Protecting against government expropriation.  The most severe cost imposed upon
investments  ex post, and the most extreme threat to any ownership advantage, is government
expropriation. All of the governments  in the region have moved  swiftly and effectively  to deal
with this concern.  First,  governments have sought to  extend protections in  their domestic
legislation.  All now provide guarantees of compensation in the event of nationalization  or
expropriation. Second  and more significantly  from the viewpoint  of American  investors, Poland,
the former CSFR, and Bulgaria have concluded bilateral investment treaties with the United
States, and a treaty with Hungary is being negotiated. The investment treaties are important
because they outline the procedures to be used in determining compensation in the event of
nationalization or expropriation. 32 Third,  fears of expropriation without compensation are
further  quieted by the membership  of the former CSFR, Hungary, and Poland in the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).  MIGA, constituted in  1988 as an independent self
supporting member of the World Bank Group, offers insurance covering currency transfer
restrictions, expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract to private firms
doing business  in member  states. 33 In sum, the fear of unanticipated  costs due to expropriation
has been greatly diminished through this interlocking  set of guarantees provided by domestic
legislation,  bilateral treaties, and insurance.
Obtaining rights to  ial  property.  The inability to acquire ownership rights in real
property can impose significant  costs on foreign investors.  Not only must they continually
renegotiate  use rights, always potentially subject to rival claims to the property, but they also
face the possibility of an "expropriation"  of economic rents by the party with full property
rights.  Suppose  foreign investor F enters into a joint venture with host H to manufacture  pins,
and F installs a specialized  pin-making machine on property controlled by H.  F's position is
much weaker than H's position, because F's asset is more specific  to that particular investment.
F cannot easily transfer specialized  equipment  because no altemative use may exist.  This is not
the case with the landowner.  Without legal rights to real property, F cannot prevent H from
31.  Article 16 of the Foreign Investment  Act set out a series of limits: (1) 15 per cent of profits in industries
the Council of Ministers designates  as important to the national economy; (2) 12 per cent for investments  in
agriculture, natual  resources,  industrial and  agricultural production, construction, communications, and
transportation;  (3) 10 per cent for finance, banking  and insurance;  (4) 8 per cent in all other cases.
32.  The EC Association  Agreements  with Poland, Hungary, and the former CSFR provide guarantees  of
national  treatment, but are not explicit  as to steps to be taken in the event of expropriation.
33.  MIGA recently extended  protection  to Coca-Cola's $US  25m investment  in a bottling facility  in Poland.14
threatening  to breach the  joint venture agreement  and thus forcing  a redistribution  of the profits.
Under these circumstances, foreign investors will be deterred from investing in capital that
cannot be secured against this type of "holdup."
Rules on land ownership by foreign parties continue to evolve across the region.  In
Bulgaria, foreign persons or companies  in which foreigners  have a stake greater than 50% may
not own agricultural land, forests or water resources. The other CEE states generally  prohibit
ownership  of land by foreigners,  but wholly  or partially foreign-owned  firms incorporated  under
domestic  law are treated flexibly. Although  rules are still somewhat  unclear and untested,  such
firms are generally considered to be domestic legal persons and thus legally  permitted to own
land.3'
Protecting  intellectual property.  Foreign  firms  often  invest  abroad  to  exploit
technological  advantages they hold over their rivals.  Technology  is an asset and a key to their
competitiveness--a  major "ownership" advantage.  Investors will be less likely to invest in
countries  that do not safeguard  intellectual  property, just as they will be hesitant  to invest where
there is a danger of expropriation  of physical assets.
Recent reforms in the intellectual  property legislation of most CEE countries, taken in
part under pressure from the U.S. 35 and other Western countries, have generally brought the
legal protection  of intellectual  property more or less up to international  norms.  For example,
patent protection has typically been extended to previously-excluded  products, such as drugs,
chemical  compounds, and plant or animal  varieties, and copyright  protection has been extended
to computer software.  The terms of patent and copyright protection have typically been
lengthened  to the international  norms of 20 and 50 years, respectively. Although  protection for
new inventions may be relatively clear, however, many issues loom in the transition from the
old to the new system.
34.  In Poland, the Minister of Internal Affairs has the authority to approve foreign ownership  of land by
individuals,  though  this is rare.  Foreign-owned  firms must seek government  approval  for land purchases,  but this
is not generally denied. In Hungary, only a Hungarian  person, legal or natural, may buy real property.  Foreign
individuals  may not acquire property.  Companies  with a head office in Hungary  and subject  to Hungarian  law are
defined as legal persons under the law, even if they are wholly or partially owned by foreigners.  However,
companies  with foreign  participation  must seek  approval from the Council  of Ministers  and show that the property
is necessary  for business  operations. In practice,  this law has been treated quite  liberally, extending  to office  space
and living quarters for formign  employees.  Romania  and CSFR follow the general pattem of prohibiting  land
ownership  by foreign individuals,  but allow ownership  by foreign firms.
35.  Bilateral  investment treaties between  the United States and Poland, Bulgaria, and C.S.F.R commit  the
signatories  to adhere to most major international  treaties on intellectual  property.  The U.S.-Hungarian  treaty is
stalled on  the  issue  of  intellectual property protection, particularly protection of  computer software and
pharmaceuticals. EC Association Agreements  with Hungary, Poland, and the former CSFR require the CEE
signatory  countries  to improve  the protection  of intellectual  property  rights to reach  the EC level of protection  within
five years.15
All of  the CEE countries are  signatories to  the  major international conventions on
intellectual  property, including the Paris Convention  for the Protection of Industrial Property,
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, and the Berne
Convention.  These conventions  provide little protection, however, in the absence of well-
designed and enforced domestic laws.
Enforcement capacity is an issue in all areas of intellectual  property law.  Although a
registration procedure exists, can a holder of intellectual  property rights actually protect those
rights if another person infringes them?  In the socialist state this was not much of an issue,
because most rights--particularly  in the case of patents and trademarks--were  held by the state.
Enforcement of intellectual property legislation will emerge as a critical issue as the private
sector and  foreign investment grow.  Giving true  meaning to  these rights  will require
institutional  strengthening  in the registration  agencies  and the courts to insure that infringements
can be identified, halted, and punished as appropriate and that the aggrieved party can be
adequately compensated.
Enforcing agreements.  The difficulty of  enforcing contracts can  be  a  significant
impediment to  foreign investment, particularly in  developing countries where formal legal
systems are often weak.  The CEE states have made significant  progress in this area, using a
combination  of external and internal institutions. Bilateral  investment  treaties  play an important
role in reducing ex post transaction costs by providing guarantees of third party arbitration.
Most CEE foreign investment laws also permit third-party arbitration.  The availability  of
arbitration helps to alleviate the concerns of many investors that the host country legal system
may not be capable of predictable and timely contract adjudication.  Yet arbitration does not
substitute  completely  for a well-functioning  judicial system, because it will be effective  only if
local  judicial institutions  are willing and able to recognize  and enforce arbitral awards if needed.
The opportunity for arbitration is expanded still further through participation in  the
Convention  of the International  Centre for Settlement  of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  The
former CSFR, Hungary and Romania have signed and ratified the ICSID convention.  The
convention provides  a  mechanism for  arbitration  between  private  investors  and  host
governments. Because  of the high level of government  involvement  in the privatization  process,
the government  is often a party to investment  contracts. Most third party arbitration mechanisms
do not allow for arbitration when one of the parties to the contract is a government. Becoming
a party to the ICSID convention  adds another level of assurance to foreign investors.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that CEE domestic courts are  often willing to  follow
established  global  business  practices  and uphold  common  Western interpretations  of contract  law.
In  1990 a dispute arose in  Hungary between the American firm Pratt &  Whitney and the
ungarian state airline Malev. 36 Pratt alleged that Malev had entered into a binding contract
36.  'Pratt  & Whitney's  dispute with Malev continues, Business Eastern  EuroDe, v.  20,  no.  41,  October  14,
1991, p.  349-50.16
for the purchase of aircraft engines by returning a letter of acceptance.  In January, 1992, a
Hungarian  court ruled in favor of Pratt, applying  the Vienna Convention  for International  Sale
of  Goods. 37 The Pratt  case is  important because Hungarian courts  moved quickly and
effectively  to resolve the dispute  despite Hungary's lack of a bilateral investment  treaty with the
U.S..  The application  of the Vienna Convention  is a positive sign to Western firms that the
Hungarian  courts will apply commonly  recognized  standards  of conduct in adjudicating  business
disputes.
Similarly, CEE countries are looking  to Western norms as they design their commercial
legislation. For example, the new commercial  code of the former CSFR, which took effect on
January 1, 1992, parallels parts of the U.S.  Uniform Commercial Code, especially Article 2
governing  contracts.
Resolving conflicts among contracting parties is  a complex task and requires well-
developed  institutions. Given the developing  domestic  legal system and the growing acceptance
of  third party  arbitration, it appears that dispute resolution may be receding as  a  major
impediment  to investment  in the region.
Hiring and firing workers.  Labor relations are a potentially  explosive  issue for foreign
investment in CEE.  Decades of central planning and the lack of hard budget constraints on
firms led to serious overstaffing  in many cases.  Western companies, as either sole owners or
joint venture partners, want the freedom to restructure  the work force to make these CEE firms
competitive  in global markets.  Political leaders are naturally concerned that high levels of
unemployment  will quickly sap support for reform.
So far, CEE legislation  does not restrict the rights of foreign companies  to hire, train,
or fire local workers, although  foreign firms must of course comply with existing social security
legislation  and pay social security taxes defined by statute.  In a number of cases, as part of
specific privatization agreements,  Western companies have  committed themselves to  a
moratorium on  reducing the  work force in  plants they control. 38 Given the  sensitivities
involved, an ad hoc approach developed through privatization negotiations is  likely to  be
preferable to an across-the-board  rule.
In some cases, foreign subsidiaries  want to hire employees from their home offices to
help transfer firm-specific knowledge and techniques, and thus reap  specific ownership or
internalization advantages.  CEE countries have been fairly accommodating to  this need,
although foreign employees must often pass through a maze of regulations to obtain work
permits and find housing. Romania  is the only CEE state that specifically  restricts the types of
positions  foreigners can hold. Romanian  law allows foreigners to work only as managers  or as
37.  "Hungarian court rules for Pratt  & Whitney,"  Business Eastern Europe,  v. 21,  no.  5,  February 3,  1992,
p. 53.
38.  Interview,  Washington, D.C.,  July 21,  1992.17
other  specialized  employees.
Providing  Special  Incentives
A third rationale  for the enclave  strategy  is to direct incentives  to foreigners,  often
implicitly  if  not explicitly  in  the belief that foreigners  are  more likely than domestic
entrepreneurs  to be decisively  influenced  by them. The emphasis  on tax credits  and subsidies
to lure investors  follows  in part from  the view that  foreign  investment  responds  to factor  prices.
Yet a single-minded  emphasis  on incentives  overlooks  the other  reasons  for foreign  investment,
i.e. that foreign  firms  may  still invest  if they  can  readily  apply  the  ownership  and internalization
advawitages  they possess.
The primary  incentives  used  in CEE  to attract  foreign  investors  are tax-related.  As seen
in Box 1, all CEE countries  now offer generous  tax incentives  to foreign  firms, incentives  that
are generally  not available  to domestic  investors. These incentives  significantly  lower the
effective  rates  of taxation. A recent study  by the Foreign  Investment  Advisory  Service  (FIAS,
part of the World Bank group) 39 estimated  the following  effective tax rates as of mid-1991  on
typical  foreign  investments  in manufacturing  in the region:






Of course  effective  tax rates  vary  from  investment  to investment,  both  because  different  projects
have  different  cost characteristics  that affect  the definition  of taxable  income,  and because  tax
regimes  themselves  often  vary by investment. Tax regimes  are often specifically  negotiated
between  foreign  firms  and host  governments  as part of the overall  foreign  investment  package.
Investment  can be re-classified  into categories  that qualify  for tax holidays,  and the length  of
holidays  can  also  be extended.  This  discretion  is in fact  a characteristic  of the enclave  approach.
Hungary  was  the first CEE  country  to offer  tax incentives,  and its incentives  are still the
most  generous.  It is tempting  to look  to Hungary's  low  estimated  effective  tax  rate and conclude
that  preferential  tax treatment  is behind  the large  share  of foreign  investment  that  has flowed  into
Hungary. Such  a conclusion,  however,  is doubtful.  Tax  rates  may  affect  short-term  profits,  but
the evidence  that they dominate  or even significantly  affect  the investment  decision  of foreign
39. J. M. Mintz and T. Tsiopoulos,  'Corporate Income  Taxation  and Foreign Direct Investment  in Central  and
Eastern Europe,"  Foreign Investment  Advisory  Service Occasional  Paper 4, 1992.18
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Perceptions  of the investment  Climate  in Europe,  the Middle  East and North Africa," EMENA  Technical
Department,  September  1992.19
long term.  Tax rates are important, and investors  will be deterred if taxes are set at exorbitant
levels, but it is not likely that the complex  packages  of reduced rates and tax holidays  currently
in place in CEE tip the balance for many prospective investors.  Many investors cannot even
use the tax holidays they are offered.  For example, General Electric's $US 150m  purchase of
50 per cent of the Hungarian lighting manufacturer  Tungsram occurred in 1989. Almost three
years later, Tungsram has yet to show a profit. 4 '
The emphasis  on incentives  has uncertain  benefits  but many clear costs, as has been noted
in analogous  discussions  of tax incentives  throughout  the developing  world. A first obvious cost
is in government  revenue, and this is important  given the fiscal  problems throughout  the region.
Another  cost is uncertainty. In their effort to fine tune the incentives  in the tax codes, the CEE
countries  have  changed their tax regulations  frequently. This has created much  confusion  among
foreign investors and compounded  their already difficult task of estimating future profit flows.
Moreover, the administrative  costs of incentives  are high. Complicated  tax codes  demand
sophisticated  bureaucracies  to administer them.  Preferential tax systems that grant benefits to
foreigners must set administrative  criteria to define "foreign" investment. Investments  have to
be screened to  see if  they meet the minimum levels of  investment needed to qualify for
preferential treatment.  Monitoring mechanisms  must be established  to audit joint ventures to
ensure that foreign participation  is genuine and not just an illusion to escape corporate taxes.
All CEE governments suffer from a shortage of skilled administrators. Diverting personnel to
administer  complex incentives  of questionable  worth is unlikely  to be an efficient use of scarce
resources.
The creation of tax incentives  also creates loopholes  and ambiguities  in the law which
firms can use to their advantage, leading to further revenue loss, creating further uncertainty,
and demanding further bureaucratic intervention  to control them.  For example, many of the
investment  laws in the region allow for credits for re-investment  of profits or for research and
development  costs.  Expenses can be easily be re categorized to fit the tax-exempted  classes.
Or firms can manipulate the date they "start" operations to extend the tax holiday beyond the
normal number  of years. Furthermore, firms  are adept at transferring  income into and expenses
out of the holiday period to minimize tax liability after the holiday expires.
Finally, preferential  tax codes for foreign investors  may also exacerbate  political  tensions
in  the region, both internally and externally.  As noted above, charges repeatedly surface
throughout  the region that politicians are "selling out" to foreign interests.  A clear tax code,
41. The FIAS study noted above  concluded  that  the tax rates of Bulgaria  and Romania  may  be so high that they
would  deter investment  in the absence  of tax holidays. The tax regimes in Hungary, Poland, and CSFR would  be
unlikely  to deter investment  even in the absence  of special  incentives.20
with reasonable  rates and equally  applicable  to domestic  and foreign  firms, may not only be
more efficient  but may also remove  a potentially  troubling  issue from the political  agenda. 42
Furthermore,  as the CEE states  begin to enter into associate  membership  with the Eluropean
Community,  their  preferential  treatment  of foreign  investors  may  complicate  the  process. in  the
spring  of 1992, the EC protested  a decree  by the Hungarian  government  that gave customs
preferences  to the Ford Motor Company  in return  for domestic  investment. 43 The Hungarian
government  agreed  to repeal Ford's preferential  treatment,  and a Ford official  responded  by
noting, "there  are easier  place  in the world  to do business  than  Hungary."4
Conclusions
Specialized  foreign  investment  laws have  a useful  role to play in the initial  period  of
transition  to a market  economy.  They  send  a strong  signal  to foreign  entrepreneurs  that the host
country  is serious  about  economic  reform  and is willing  to work with investors  to establish  a
mutually  beneficial  legal  regime. These  laws  tend  to create  investment  "enclaves"  that not only
serve  this signaling  function  but also may target  special  incentives  to foreigners  and create  an
"island"  of legal  development  that may  differ  from--and  sometimes  outpace--development  in the
rest of the domestic  legal framework.
Yet to the extent  the enclave  separates  foreign  from domestic  investors,  it can quickly
outlive  its usefulness.  The incentives  it fosters  not only  bleed  domestic  treasuries,  but they  lead
to bureaucratic  structures  that may unnecessarily  complicate  the investment  environment  and
raise information  and transaction  costs for foreign  investors.  As quickly as possible,  the
transforming  economies  should  dismantle  the enclave  and put domestic  and foreign  investors  on
an equal  footing. 45 This may well mean  that foreign  investment  laws are no longer needed;
indeed,  CSFR  was the first CEE country  to abolish  specific  foreign  investment  legislation  in
favor  of a broad  commercial  code  covering  all investors  in the economy.
Furthermore,  if an enclave  does  exist,  policy  makers  should  try to focus  on the concerns
critical  to foreign  firms.  In the design  of investment  laws to date, the CEE countries  have
perhaps  paid too much  attention  to preferential  tax schemes  while  ignoring  other  costs faced  by
foreign  investors. Policy  makers  in reforming  economies  should  focus  primarily  on reducing
uncertainty  and  transaction  costs  through  clear  and simple  legislation,  dismantling  of unnecessary
42. In Czechoslovakia,  public  protest  was voiced  against  tax concessions  demanded  by Mercedes  Benz  in return
for foreign investment. EBRD Watch, v.2, no. 4, February 3, 1992, p.4.
43.  Nicholas  Denton, "Hungary accused  on van tariff," Financial  Times, Many 30, 1992, p. 2.
44.  Ken Kasriel, sunra note 24, p.2.
45.  Similar  conclusions  are embodied  in the Guidelines  on the Treatment  of Foreign Direct Investment  recently
published  by  the World Bank Group.  Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, Vol. II:
Guidelines,  World Bank Group, 1992.21
bureaucratic  intervention,  contract enforcement,  support of arbitration  and other alternative
dispute  resolution  mechanisms,  strengthening  protection  of property  rights,  and active  efforts  to
disseminate  information  on the legal framework  and on business  opportunities. Cornplex
regulations  not only  increase  investor  uncertainty,  but they  divert  bureaucratic  resources  that  the
host  country  cannot  afford  to squander.
The  CEE  states have shown remarkable willingness  to  restructure their legal
environments  to attract  investment.  There  are signs  that increasing  attention  is now being  paid
to lowering transaction  costs for foreign investors.  In early 1992, for example, Poland
announced  the  creation  of a new  investment  agency  whose  goal  is to disseminate  information  and
provide help to foreign  investors  in navigating  investments  through  the bureaucracy. The
adoption  of these  and similar  measures  in the  other  CEE  states  would  further  improve  the overall
investment  climate  and place  them  in a more  advantageous  position  in the growing  worldwide
competition  for scarce  investment  capital.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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